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AMERICA'S ORGAN DONATION CRISIS: HOW
CURRENT LEGISLATION MUST BE SHAPED BY
SUCCESSES ABROAD
Lisa M Derco*
I. INTRODUCTION
On February 16, 1990, Susan Renea Sutton, a twenty-eight year old from
Oklahoma, took her own life after an argument with her boyfriend.' Shortly
after arriving at an Oklahoma City hospital, Sutton was declared brain dead.
Suddenly, her parents were left with the difficult decision of whether to
donate her organs, possibly to save the lives of others. 3  After much
consideration, they decided to allow Susan's heart, liver, corneas, and some
of her bones and skin to be removed for transplantation.4 Following the
surgeries, the hospital and medical teams that participated in the transplants
received thousands of dollars from the recipients' insurance companies,
Medicare, or Medicaid.5 The nonprofit agency involved in coordinating the
* J.D. Candidate, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law, May
2011; B.S., Pennsylvania State University, May 2005. The author would like to thank
her very patient husband, Drew Derco, and her parents, Bill and Shirl Skweres, for all of
their love and support along the way. The author would also like to thank the Journal of
Contemporary Health Law and Policy, Volume XXVII editors, staff members, and
advisor, Professor of Law, George P. Smith, II, for all of their hard work and dedication.
1. Peter S. Young, Moving to Compensate Families in Human-Organ Market, N.Y.
TIMES, July 8, 1994, at B7.
2. Id.
3. Id
4. Id
5. Id A study by The Journal of the American Medical Association assessed the
costs associated with transplantations and found that in 1991 hospitals charged an
average of $15,683 for a kidney, $16,050 for a heart and $20,776 for a liver. Id. One of
the doctors who conducted the study, Dr. Roger W. Evans, stated that hospitals that
perform transplantations usually increase the cost of performing the procedure "by as
much as 200 percent to cover such things as losses from inadequate Government
reimbursement and patients' inability to pay." Young, supra note 1. He went on to state
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transplants, the Oklahoma Organ Sharing Network, received at least $22,000
for its efforts.6 Sadly, Susan's family did not receive any compensation for
their daughter's anatomical gifts, and therefore, was unable to afford a
proper funeral for their daughter.7 Consequently, her family had no choice
but to bury Susan in an unmarked grave.
Each day, a staggering number of candidates assume positions on the
Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network's (OPTN) national patient
waiting list, a list that totaled approximately 109,967 people as of December
2, 2010.9 From January through August 2010, 19,249 transplants took place,
while there were only 9,729 donors for the same time period.'o This
translates into over 6,000 people losing their lives while waiting for an organ
that a donor who donates more than one organ "can generate considerable revenue as
each recipient is separately billed for each donor organ." Id.
6. Id.
The fee included $460 for each of four ambulance trips (pick up and delivery of
the heart and the liver); $9,000 to $10,000 for the hospital where Ms. Sutton
died (covering operating room, intensive care and medications to maintain the
body); $300 to $400 for blood testing to protect organ recipients against
illnesses like AIDS and hepatitis; $800 for kidney type matching, and $8,000
for the transplant agency's overhead, or salaries, office space and telephone.
Id. Dr. Roger W. Evans, the Director of Health Services evaluation at the Mayo Clinic in
Rochester, Minnesota and the author of many studies on transplantation costs compares
the fees the doctors and nonprofit organizations to "a car at a chop shop. Somebody's
making a handsome fee off of processing the parts." Id.
7. Id.
8. Young, supra note 1. The debate about providing the family of donors some
form of compensation is gaining momentum. Id However, in order to provide
compensation to the families, the Federal law which bans the purchase of organs, but
allows payments for the services surrounding organ transplantations, must be
circumvented or abolished altogether. Id. As Fred H. Cate, an associate professor at
Indiana University School of Law states, "[w]e buy and sell body parts all the time; we
just don't call it that. What advocates are saying is, 'Let's call a spade a spade. And let's
not exclude the donor or the donor's family from a market that everyone else is
participating in."' Id
9. OPEN PROCUREMENT AND TRANSPLANTATION NETWORK, http://optn.transplant.
hrsa.gov/ (last visited Dec. 2, 2010).
10. Id.
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this year, or almost one person each hour.1 2 However, simply increasing
the number of donors could save many of these lives.13 It is estimated that
between 10,500 and 16,800 potential donors die each year,14 and if three
organs were harvested from each of these potential donors, over 30,000
additional organs would become available, significantly boosting the number
of organs already contributed by live donors.'5
The startling length of the waiting list alone demonstrates the dire need for
legislation to address the perpetual organ shortage in the United States. In
1984, Congress passed the National Organ Transplant Act (NOTA) as an
attempt to address the lack of organ donors and to prohibit the sale of organs
in the United States.16  However, the number of donors has failed to
increase; in fact, since the enactment of NOTA, the waiting list for organ
transplants has more than quadrupled due to a lack of donors.17  The
continual rise in the number of waiting list candidates evidences the failures
I1. Wait-Listed to Death Improving Incentives for Organ Donation, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 17, 2008, at A20 [hereinafter Wait-Listed to Death]. However, the number who die
waiting do not include those people who were once on the waiting list, but their health
had deteriorated to the point where transplantation was no longer an option and they were
removed from the waiting list. Arthur J. Matas, A Gifi of Life Deserves Compensation:
How to Increase Living Kidney Donation with Realistic Incentives, 604 POL'Y ANALYSIS,
CATO INSTITUTE 4 (November 7, 2007), http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-604.pdf.
12. UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (2009) (prefatory note), available at
http://www.anatomicalgiftact.org/DesktopDefault.aspx?tabindex=1&tabid=63.
13. "It is because man is part saint and part sinner that we have the tragedy of many
thousands of people needlessly suffering and dying each year while the precious organs
that could restore them to health are fed to worms." Lloyd R. Cohen, Increasing the
Supply of Transplant Organs: The Virtues ofa Futures Market, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1, 51 (1989).
14. INSTITUTE OF MED. COMM. ON INCREASING RATES OF ORGAN DONATION, ORGAN
DONATION: OPPORTUNITIES FOR ACTION 22 (James F. Childress & Catharyn T. Liverman
eds.) (2006).
15. "Although the number of potential cadaveric donors each year is difficult to
estimate, studies often find that the number could provide enough transplant organs to
meet or exceed the demand." Ann McIntosh, Regulating the "Gift of Life" - The 1987
Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, 65 WASH. L. REv. 171, 185 (1990).
16. S. REP. No. 98-382, at 2-3 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3974.
17. Wait-Listed to Death, supra note 11.
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of NOTA and a need for new ways to tackle the nation's shortage in organ
donors. On one side of the issue, says Alexander M. Capron,' 8 the Director
of the Ethics, Trade, Human Rights and Health Law at the World Health
Organization (WHO),19 are transplant surgeons who believe that offering
payments to donors is the best way to remedy the shortage of organs; on the
other side of the issue are those who "fear[] that the line between selling
organs and actually selling people is a rather fine one." 20 Notably, many
states offer compensation to families who donate the bodies of their loved
ones to scientific research, but this compensation is unavailable if donating
organs.21 As the statistics above indicate, current regulations, including
NOTA, have failed either to increase the number of organ donors or to
decrease the waiting list for organs in the United States. Accordingly, new
regulations are needed to solve the shortage of organs and to save the lives
of thousands on the waiting list.
This Note will discuss existing legislation regulating organ donation in the
United States and explore the goals behind many of the relevant statutes. It
will then address foreign legislation regarding organ transplantation, in
particular the donor vendor systems in Spain and Iran. Both of these
18. Ethics and Health, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/ethics/about/
capron/en/ (last visited Oct. 26, 2010). "He joined WHO in October 2002 to launch the
Ethics and Health Initiative in the Director's General Office. " Id.
19. "WHO is the directing and coordinating authority for health within the United
Nations system. It is responsible for providing leadership on global health matters,
shaping the health research agenda, setting norms and standards, articulating evidence-
based policy options, providing technical support to countries and monitoring and.
assessing health trends." Id.
20. Larry Rohter, The Organ Trade: A Global Black Market; Tracking the Sale of a
Kidney On a Path of Poverty and Hope, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2004, at Al. The National
Kidney Foundation is currently exploring the idea of providing financial incentives to
donors, but has "recommended no action until such incentives 'are widely accepted as
being different from the purchasing of organs."' Young, supra note 1.
21. Alexander Tabarrok, Life-Saving Incentives: Consequences, Costs and Solutions
to the Organ Shortage, LIBR. OF ECON. & LIBERTY (Aug. 3, 2009), http://www.econlib.org
/library/Columns/y2009/Tabarroklifesaving.html.
In many states, for example, medical schools offer free cremation services to
families that donate the bodies for medical research. Thus we have the bizarre
situation where a medical school can compensate a donor for their whole body,
if they use the body for teaching, but if they use an organ from that same body
to save a life that would be illegal.
Id.
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22
systems have proven to be successful, but have some drawbacks as well.
Next, this Note will discuss the Organ Trafficking Prohibition Act of 2009
(OTPA), proposed in the 111 Congress by former Senator Arlen Specter.23
OTPA is a solid starting point for new legislation regulating organ
procurement, but legislation in this area must present a more comprehensive
scheme than OTPA offers if it is to make a significant impact. This Note
suggests three elements that any legislation aimed at increasing the number
of organ donors should contain: (1) allowing the donee, or a non-profit
agency if the donee is impoverished, to pay for any out-of-pocket expenses
the donor may face as a result of the donation; (2) expanding organ
procurement organizations (OPOs) currently in place and implementing a
more family-centered approach to OPOs; and (3) permitting specific
incentives, other than direct compensation, in order to entice more people to
donate. Finally, this Note will discuss alternative ways to increase the
number of donors, and as a last resort, ways to decrease the waiting list.
11. LEGISLATION
A. Prior Legislative Attempts to Address Organ Donation
The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA), enacted in 1968, provides
states with a roposed set of regulations regarding organ donation and
transplantation. These regulations range from dictating who can make
anatomical gifts of decedents' bodies to outlining the rights and duties of
procurement organizations and other entities that may be involved in the
25
organ transplantation process. The goal of UAGA is to provide
consistency among state laws regarding organ transplants, to eliminate
22. Foreign organ donation laws and how they can impact legislation in the U.S. has
been discussed previously. See generally Sarah Elizabeth Statz, Finding the Winning
Combination: How Blending Organ Procurement Systems Used Internationally Can
Reduce the Organ Shortage, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1677 (2006); J. Andrew
Hughes, You Get What You Pay For?: Rethinking U.S. Organ Procurement Policy in
Light of Foreign Models, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 351 (2006). However, this Note
specifically focuses on the Organ Trafficking Prohibition Act of2009 and how it can be
improved upon by looking at the successes and failures of foreign legislation.
23. Nathan Guttman, Kidney Donation Scandal Sparks New Debate Over Specter's
Organ Legislation, THE JEWISH DAILY FORWARD (Aug. 5, 2009), http://www.forward.
com/articles/1 11473/.
24. UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT, supra note 12.
25. Id.
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variations among state statutes that impede the procurement of organs, and
to combat the organ shortage by providing states with mechanisms to
increase the number of donors.26 It also requires that a person make a
"positive affirmation of an intent to make a gift," and prohibits "the sale and
purchase of organs." 27 By enacting these initial standards, UAGA laid the
groundwork for the current regulations surrounding organ transplantation
and methods to increase donors.
Another important piece of legislation regulating organ donations is
NOTA. Although the statistics suggest NOTA has been relatively
unsuccessful, one positive outcome of NOTA was the establishment of
OPTN, which "arrange[s] for the acquisition and preservation of donated
organs and provide[s] quality standards for the acquisition of organs." 28
However, NOTA also made it "unlawful for any person to knowingly
acquire, receive, or otherwise transfer any human organ for valuable
consideration for use in human transplantation if the transfer affects
interstate commerce."29 Violators face a $50,000 fine and up to five years in
prison.30 NOTA states that "'valuable consideration' does not include the
reasonable payments associated with the removal, transportation,
implantation, processing, preservation, quality control, and storage of a
human organ or the expenses of travel, housing and lost wages incurred by
the donor of a human organ in connection with the donation of the organ."3 1
NOTA was enacted in recognition of the advancements in organ
transplantation and in an effort "to encourage organ donation and to improve
26. Id. Most states have implemented some version of the UAGA and have also
added their own amendments. Id.
27. Id. The UAGA is "designed to encourage the making of anatomical gifts" while
"honor[ing] and respect[ing] the autonomy interest of individuals to make or not to make
an anatomical gift of their body or parts." Id.
28. 42 U.S.C. § 273(b)(3)(C) (2006).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 274e (a) (2006).
30. Wait-Listed to Death, supra note 11.
31. 42 U.S.C.A. § 274e (c)(2) (2006). Consideration is required in order to form a
binding contract. Consideration is defined as "a performance or a return promise [that]
must be bargained for." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §71 (1981). "A
performance or return promise is bargained for if it is sought by the promisor in exchange
for his promise and is given by the promisee in exchange for that promise." Id.
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procedures for efficient organ procurement leading to successful
transplantation."32
The Department of Justice (DOJ) has stated that "valuable consideration"
under NOTA refers to a "commercial transaction," because the goal of
NOTA, when enacted, was to make the sale of organs illegal.33 Therefore,
the DOJ has found that NOTA does not prohibit states from using incentives
that do not involve the buying or selling of organs as a way to increase the
number of donors.34 The legislative history of NOTA supports the DOJ's
interpretation, clearly demonstrating that the objective of Congress in
enacting the valuable consideration provisionwas to make the buying and
selling of organs illegal.
However, the term "valuable consideration," was not expressly defined in
the legislative history, other than as "Congress's intent to criminalize the
buying and selling of organs for profit." 36 For example, the Senate's Labor
and Human Resources Committee Report stated that "[i]t is the sense of the
Committee that individuals or organizations should not profit by the sale of
human organs for transplantation."37 The hefty fine and jail time associated
with violating NOTA has caused the states to interpret the meaning of
"valuable consideration" very broadly in order to avoid these severe
consequences. As a result, many states have not offered any type of
32. S. REP. No. 98-382, at 4 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3974.
33. Support Introduction of the Organ Trafficking Prohibition Act, PKD FOUND.,
http://www.pkdcure.org/Portals/0/Downloads/Advocacy/Organ%20Trafficking%20Prohi
bition%20Act%20Leavebehind%202009%20-%20FINAL.pdf (last visited Dec. 3, 2010).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. ERIN D. WILLIAMS ET AL., CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: LIVING ORGAN
DONATION AND VALUABLE CONSIDERATION 9 (2007). A Virginia physician's attempt to
address the organ shortage by brokering living donors' kidneys for a profit prompted
Congress to prohibit the sale of organs. Fred H. Cate, Human Organ Transplantation:
The Role ofLaw, 20 J. CORP. LAw 69, 80 (1994).
37. S. REP. No. 98-382, at 16-17 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3974, 3982.
See also H. REP. No. 98-1127, at 16 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3989, 3992
("This Title intends to make the buying and selling of human organs unlawful.").
38. Wait-Listed to Death, supra note 11. The large fines and the possibility of jail
time have discouraged the states from passing legislation that provides incentives to
donors. Id. Congress has not precisely defined "valuable consideration" as it applies to
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incentives for people to become organ donors.39  The true meaning of
"valuable consideration" is important to the debate surrounding organ
donation because its meaning will define what incentives are legally
permissible for the states to enact in order to increase the number of organ
donors.
Another piece of legislation that adds to the guidelines established in
NOTA is the Organ Donation and Recovery Improvement Act of 2004.40
This statute makes grants available for OPOs, which coordinate organ
transplantations in designated service areas.4 ' It also establishes a task force
that is required to submit a bi-yearly report to Congress detailing the rate of
organ donation and recovery as well as recommending public education
42programs to increase awareness of the need for organ donors. The current
legislative environment in the United States, while clearly encouraging
organ donations, provides little to no incentive for people to donate;
therefore, many people die needlessly while on the organ waiting list.43
NOTA and the states are unwilling to gamble as to what Congress means by the term
when there are harsh consequences if their interpretation is incorrect. Id.
39. Id. For example, Pennsylvania passed a program that paid for the burial
expenses for organ donors, but the state employees would not implement the program
because they feared federal prosecution under NOTA. Id See also Patrick D. Carlson,
The 2004 Organ Donation Recovery and Improvement Act: How Congress Missed an
Opportunity to Say "Yes" to Financial Incentives for Organ Donation, 23 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POL'Y 136 (2006).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 273 (2006).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 273(a).
42. National Organ Transplant Act, Pub. L. No. 98-507, § 101, 98 Stat. 2339 (1984).
43. This unfortunate effect was discovered by a Brooklyn woman who recounts her
struggle:
"I had been on dialysis for 15 years and on two transplant lists for 7," said the
woman, who asked not to be identified by name, for fear of losing support
payments vital to maintaining the health of her transplanted organ. "Nothing
was happening, and my health was getting worse and worse." Finally, she said,
"my doctors told me to get a kidney any way 1 could," or expect to die.
Rohter, supra note 20. She took the doctor's advice seriously and bought a kidney on the
black market in Israel and received the transplantation in South Africa. Id. The
Brooklyn woman is not alone. Although most countries prohibit the sale of organs, a
flourishing black market for organ sales still exists. Matas, supra note I1, at 6.
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B. Foreign Attempts to Legislate Organ Donation
1. The Spanish Model
When considering changes in the current organ donation system, the
United States must examine similar efforts abroad, particularly that of Spain,
which has been deemed the leader in organ donation.44 Spain, Belgium and
Norway have passed presumed consent laws, which automatically consider
citizens to be organ donors unless they opt-out of the program. 45 Individuals
can opt-out of the program by registering their wish not to donate.46
However, in Spain, eighty to eighty-five percent of potential donors
donate.47 Spain has taken the presumed consent method one step further by
implementing a network of transplant coordinators who are present in all
48168 hospitals in the country. The coordinators speak to grieving families
about the possibility of donating the organs of their dying or recently
deceased loved ones for the benefit of others.49 This family-based ap roach
is instrumental to the success of Spain's organ donation program. The
benefits of the family-based approach are significant, as evidenced in a study
of the system that noted, "of families who had initially refused consent,
seventy-eight percent changed their mind after having had discussions with
the transplant coordinators."51 The coordinators' efforts have led to an
increase in the number of deceased donors from fourteen per one million
44. Grace Wong, Spain Leads the Way in Organ Donation, CNNHEALTH.COM (June
17. 2009), http://www.cnn.com/2009/HEALTH/06/17/organ.donation/. See also Daniel
Silva, Spain Leads World in Organ Donation, AFP (Dec. 19, 2009), http://www.google.
com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5jF I ggVkn0I CjdXVi8kEVToJyaTjA.
45. Wong, supra note 44.
46. Q&A: Organ Donation Laws, BBC NEWS (Nov. 17, 2008, 1:19 PM), http://news.
bbc.co.uk/2/hiIhealth/7733190.stm.
47. Wong, supra note 44.
48. Silva, supra note 44.
49. Id.
50. R. Matesanz, A Decade of Continuous knprovement in Cadaveric Organ
Donation: the Spanish Model, 21 NEFROLOGIA 59, 60 (2001).
5 1. Id.
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citizens in 1989, when the system was implemented, to approximately thirty-
four per one million citizens in 2008, which is the highest rate in the world. 2
The family-based approach used in Spain would easily convert to a
system implemented in the United States. OPOs could train their employees
on how to counsel families and achieve the best result for all parties
involved. However, implementing the presumed consent aspect of the
Spanish model in the U.S. would prove to be more difficult, because it takes
away the choice of an individual to become an organ donor, and could
potentially raise issues concerning one's fundamental Constitutional rights.
These issues are currently being debated in New York, where the idea of
implementing a presumed consent system is being discussed. 54 The United
States must examine all of the alternatives that are currently being used
abroad and form them into a unique system that can be successful in
America.
2. The Iranian Model
The organ donation system of Iran must also be considered by the United
States when revising the current organ donation system, because Iran is the
only country in the world without an organ shortage.55 Since 1996, Iran has
permitted the sale of organs through a state-regulated system.56 Iran is both
the only country in the world without a shortage of organ donors and the
only country that allows organs to be sold.57 In Iran, the organ donation
52. Silva, supra note 44. The rate for the European Union was 18.2 per one million
in 2008 and 26.3 in the United States. Id. Further, only about fifteen percent of families
refused to allow their family's organs to be donated. This rate was forty percent in the
1980s. Id.
53. See Alexander Powhida, Forced Organ Donation: The Presumed Consent to
Organ Donation Laws of the Various Slates and the United States Constitution, 9 ALB.
L.J. Sci. & TECH. 349, 364 -74 (1999).
54. See Should Laws Push for Organ Donation?, N.Y. TIMES, (May 2, 2010, 7:00
PM), http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/05/02/should-laws-encourage-organ-
donation/.
55. Benajmin E. Hippen, Organ Sales and Moral Travails Lessons Learned from the
Living Kidney Vendor Program in Iran, 614 POL'Y ANALYSIS, CATO INSTITUTE 1 (March
20, 2008), http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-614.pdf.
56. Rohter, supra note 20.
57. Hippen, supra note 55.
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process begins when donors independently contact the Dialysis and
Transplant Patient Association (DATPA). Donors are then referred to a
transplant center and are evaluated by medical personnel. 9 Donors receive
$1,200 and health insurance from the government for their donation. 60
Donors also receive compensation from the recipient; however, if the
recipient cannot afford to compensate the donor, several charities have been
established to provide compensation to the donor.61 While the Iranian
system provides direct donor compensation from both the government and
the recipient, it also has safeguards in place to ensure organs are distributed
in an equitable manner.62
The Iranian system, although controversial, has been very successful. The
effectiveness of the Iranian system in increasing the number of donors is
clear: as of 1999, just eleven years after Iran legalized the sale of organs,
there is no longer a waiting list for kidneys.63 The Iranian system has also
increased the country's donations by uncompensated deceased individuals
tenfold in the past eight years.64 Furthermore, the Iranian system acts as a
65deterrent to illegal organ sales. DATPA ensures that donors are truthful
when making medical history disclosures, which encourages people seeking
organs to use the system rather than attempting to buy an organ on their
66own.
58. Kerry Howley, Kidneys for Sale: Iranian Organ Donation, REASON.COM (June
2008), http://reason.com/ archives/2008/05/13/kidneys-for-sale.
59. Hippen, supra note 55, at 3. This separation between the role of identifying
donors "from the role of evaluating their medical, surgical, and psychological suitability
permits transplant professionals to avoid confusing judgment on a vendor's candidacy
with various financial and professional incentives to perform more transplants." Id at 4.
60. Howley, supra note 58.
61. Id. This amount is usually around $2,300 to $4,500. Hippen, supra note 55, at 4.
62. Rohter, supra note 20.
63. Hippen, supra note 55, at 4.
64. Howley, supra note 58. Posthumous donations began in 2000 and have grown
alongside living donations. Id.
65. Hippen, supra note 55, at 4.
66. Id.
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The system has avoided discrimination based upon the income of the
recipient by developing charities to provide compensation to the donor, if
the recipient cannot afford to do so. Possible discrimination based upon the
income of the recipient is a major argument for opponents to the
67
establishment of a similar vendor program in the United States. The
Iranians, however, have ensured that donors are not exploited by physicians,
middlemen, or procurement institutions by allowing DATPA to monitor all
transplantations. Finally, providing compensation to the donors is cost-
effective because it is less expensive than the treatment of the failing
organ. 69
However, even with precautions in place, the system in Iran has produced
negative effects on donors. Many Iranian donors have come to regret their
decisions to donate their organs and have suffered medical complications as
a result of donating. Two studies performed by Javaad Zargooshi from the
Department of Urology at Kermanshah University Medical Sciences in Iran
reflect the negative views held by donors post-donation. 7' The studies show
that ninety-two percent of donors said their "surgery and recovery" was
"more painful than expected" and fifty-eight percent reported that vending
had a "very negative impact on [their] health." 72 Thirty-eight percent of
donors also reported that they lost their jobs as a result of "postoperative
pain and disability."73 Given these negative consequences, it is no wonder
that eighty-five percent of donors regret their decisions and, in hindsight,
would not have donated.74 Adding to the donor's disappointment is the fact
67. Id.
68. Id. at 4-5.
69. Matas, supra note 11, at 6. For example, dialysis treatment for one person costs
around $95,000 and the person being treated costs the government an additional $75,000
in lost income taxes and nonmedical services resulting in around $270,000 being spent
total. Id. Therefore, compensating donors with anything less than this amount would
result in a gain. Id.
70. Guttman, supra note 23.
71. See Javaad Zargooshi, Iranian Kidney Donors: Motivations and Relations with
Recipients, 165 J. OF UROLOGY 386 (2001); Javaad Zargooshi, Quality of Life of Iranian
Kidney "Donors", 166 J. OF UROLOGY 1790 (2001).
72. Zargooshi, Quality ofLife, supra note 71, at 1797-98.
73. Id. at 1793.
74. Id. at 1790.
1652010
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that the financial incentives are not significant enough to make an impact on
the donor's life.75  Moreover, a majority of the organ donors in Iran are
impoverished, which may spark concerns that the donors are coerced into
76donation. However, this fear can be dispelled by the fact that donors
present themselves to DATPA77 and doctors are not permitted to solicit
donors themselves.78
Despite the cultural, political and religious differences79 between the
United States and Iran, the United States could greatly benefit from
reviewing the Iranian model when considering options for a domestic organ
donation system. Analyzing the costs and benefits of the Iranian system
would enable the U.S. to tackle the potential downfalls in the planning stage,
before they occur in a new system. Additionally, the United States can
enhance its system by evaluating the great success of the Iranian system in
reducing the shortage of organs in its country. The U.S. must combat the
unfortunate consequences associated with the Iranian system by examining
the long-term side effects associated with organ donation and ensuring that
that these risks are adequately communicated to all donors.80  Also,
"providing more legal and social benefits to paid . . . donors, in addition to
financial incentives, will satisfy them better in the long term." The U.S.
75. Ahad J. Ghods & Shekoufeh Savaj, Iranian Model ofPaid and Regulated Living-
Unrelated Kidney Donation, I CLINICAL J. AM. Soc'Y NEPHROLOGY 616, 621 (2006).
76. Hippen, supra note 55, at 7.
77. Id. at 3. "An offer cannot be coercive if the relationship is initiated by the person
in danger of being coerced" and "the donor makes an autonomous decision and, in return,
receives substantial compensation that may significantly improve his or her quality of
life," thus alleviating the fear of any exploitation. Matas, supra note 11, at 17. This view
that the quality of life of the donor is greatly increased as a result of the donation was
echoed by the donor of the Brooklyn women's kidney when he stated that money initially
motivated his choice to become a donor he also became "moved by the chance to help a
stranger." Rohter, supra note 20.
78. Hippen, supra note 55, at 3.
79. For example, the Catholic Church has taken a firm stance against the sale of
organs. ZENIT NEWS AGENCY, Pope Warns of the Dangers of Selling Human Organs,
CATHOLIC ONLINE, http://www.catholic.org/international/international story.php?id
=30460. Pope Benedict XVI has stated that "[tihe donation of one's organs is a free act
of charity, and should not be submitted to the 'logic of the market."' Id.
80. Hippen, supra note 55, at 10-11.
81. Ghods & Savaj, supra note 75, at 621.
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must examine the pros and cons of the Iranian model and use that
information to develop a system that will work successfully in the United
States.
3. Organ Donation Systems in Other Countries
Several countries, such as France, Canada, and the United Kingdom,
allow for some type of reimbursement to organ donors. France requires that
donors be reimbursed for all travel and accommodation expenses. Canada
has federal incentives for donors, including employment insurance, short-
term disability, and tax credits for medical expenses.83  While the United
Kingdom permits reimbursement of lost wages, travel costs and
accommodation expenses, it is not mandatory that the health service
reimburse donors. These statutory schemes are particularly effective
because they give the jurisdiction within each country discretion to
determine which method is best to increase the number of organ donors.
This is not the case in the United States, where the federal government has
effectively banned similar state-determined incentives by not clearly stating
what is considered "valuable consideration." This ambiguity has restricted
the states' ability to determine the best way to procure resident donors.
In a model similar to that employed in the United States, other countries
such as Hungary, Portugal, Slovakia, and Turkey do not permit any form of
compensation to donors.85  However, foreign organ donation laws are
anything but consistent. 86  The World Medical Association87 and the
82. Scott Klarenbach, Amit X. Garg & Sorina Vlaicu, Living Organ Donors Face
Financial Barriers: A National Reimbursement Policy is Needed, 6 CAN. MED. Ass'N J.
797, 797 (2006).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See Lori Hartwell, Global Organ Donation Policies Around the World,
www.lorihartwell.com/GlobalOrganDoantionPolicies.pdf (last visited Dec. 2, 2010).
Additionally, OTPA references legislation enacted in Israel as an example of how other
countries are providing incentives to increase the number of organ donors. Guttman,
supra note 23. Israel currently compensates donors with $5,000, additional health care
and social security benefits. Id. The goal of Israel's organ donation statute was for Israel
to be able to meet the need for organ transplants within the country and to prevent people
from traveling elsewhere to find needed organs. Id The law was passed in March 2008,
but there are currently no studies available on its impact. Id.
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American Medical Association Council on Ethics and Judicial Affairs88
found a difference between reimbursing a donor for medical expenses and a
donor receiving a financial gain for selling an organ.89 Providing organ
donors with compensation for medical expenses makes the donor whole
again; it puts the donor back to where he or she was prior to the donation.
However, even this sort of reimbursement is not a strong incentive to
donate.90
C. The View of the World Health Organization
WHO outlines guiding principles on human cell, tissue, and organ
transplants that are "intended to provide an orderly, ethical and acceptable
framework for the acquisition and transplantation of human cells, tissues and
organs for therapeutic purposes."91 WHO advocates that organs should not
be sold, but that donation systems should "not preclude reimbursing
reasonable and verifiable expenses incurred by the donor, including loss of
income, or paying the costs of recovery, processing, preserving and
87. The World Medical Association provides ethical guidance to physicians, national
medical associations, governments and international organizations throughout the world.
WORLD MED. Assoc., http://www.wma.net/en/60about/20whatwedo/index.html (last
visited Oct 26, 2010).
88. The Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs develops ethics policy for the
American Medical Association by "prepar[ing] reports that analyze and address timely
ethical issues that confront physicians and the medical profession." Council on Ethical
and Judicial Affairs, AM. MED. Assoc., http://www.ama-assn.org/amalpub/about-
ama/our-people/ama-councils/council-ethical-judicial-affairs.shtml (last visited Oct. 26,
2010).
89. Klarenbach, supra note 82.
90. The other side of this argument is that "banning payment on ethical grounds to
prevent [exploitation] overlooks one important fact: to the person who needs money to
feed his children or to purchase medical care for her parent, the option of not selling a
body part is worse than the option of selling it." L.B. Andrews, My Body, My Property, 5
HASTINGS CTR. REP. 28, 32 (1986). As evidenced by the donor of the Brooklyn woman's
kidney who stated, "[s]ix grand is a lot of money, especially when you don't have any."
Rohter, supra note 20.
91. WHO Guiding Principles on Human Cell, Tissue and Organ Transplantation,
WORLD HEALTH ORG. (May 26, 2008), http://www.searo.who.int/LinkFiles/BCT
WHO_guiding_ principles_ organtransplantation.pdf.
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supplying ... organs for transplantation." 92 However, WHO states that "free
periodic medical assessments related to the donation and insurance for death
or complications that arise from the donation may legitimately be provided
to living donors." 93
The United States should consider the points expressed by WHO, and
allow more flexibility in the means used to attract people to become organ
donors. It is not necessary that incentives include financial gain for donors,
but the donors should, at the very least, be returned to the position they were
in before the donation. Ideally, there should be incentives, but not direct
payments, to entice more people to become donors.
Additionally, if other nations would look to the guidelines defined by
WHO and establish their organ procurement systems accordingly, it would
result in consistent statutes across the world. The consistency of banning the
express sale of organs in international statutes would restrict people from
traveling abroad in order to purchase an organ. However, countries would
still be permitted to find ways of offering incentives to increase the number
of donors in their respective jurisdictions.
Ill. PROPOSED LEGISLATION: ORGAN TRAFFICKING PROHIBITION ACT OF
2009
A. Background on the Organ Trafficking Prohibition Act
The OTPA proposal was drafted to alleviate the consequences of NOTA's
prohibition against providing organs for valuable consideration.94  Former
Senator Arlen Specter, along with co-sponsoring Senators Tom Harkin (D-
IA) and Bob Casey, Jr. (D-PA), were responsible for drafting and circulating
the proposed legislation throughout the Senate, although as of December
2010, it has yet to be formally introduced. 95 OTPA clarifies NOTA by
92. Id. at 5. The notes on this particular guiding principle reflect the controversial
nature of implementing regulations in the area of organ transplantation, especially when
considering incentives. Id.
93. Id. Further, "health authorities should promote donation motivated by the need
of the recipient and the benefit for the community." Id. The guiding principle also
cautions that any incentives should be defined explicitly. Id.
94. Wait-Listed to Death, supra note 11.
95. Support Introduction, supra note 33. See also Guttman, supra note 23. Both
Senator Harkin and Senator Casey are graduates of the Catholic University of America
Columbus School of Law, class of 1972 and class of 1968, respectively. Laywers in the
II1th Congress - Senate, A.B.A., http://www.abanet.org/poladv/documents/lawyers I11
congress-senate.pdf (last visited Dec. 3, 2010). OTPA has been endorsed by many
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permitting states to provide incentives to donors, on the condition that the
incentives do not include any direct payments.96  Permissible incentives
under OTPA include tax deductions, coverage of burial costs, life insurance,
and health insurance.97  OTPA does not establish or fund any particular
incentive plan; therefore, it does not condone commercial transactions for
organs, but gives individual states more flexibility in determining the best
way to increase the number of donors within its jurisdiction. While
providing these incentives, OTPA also "increase[s] supervision to avoid the
buying and selling of human organs." 99  One way OTPA accomplishes this
is by increasing the criminal penalty for organ trafficking by imposing a
seven-year sentence on such acts. 00
B. Rationale Behind the Organ Trafficking Prohibition Act
Many donors are adversely affected by the costs associated with donating
an organ.101 Donors face many financial obstacles, including "travel for
tests, appointments and hospital admission; accommodation; long-distance
telephone charges; and incidental medical costs such as fees for medications
after discharge.,'02 They also face more indirect financial consequences,
such as being unable to work or engage in leisure activities, having to hire
someone to take care of their house and perform daily tasks, and having to
health care organizations including the American Medical Association, the PKD
Foundation and the American Association of Kidney Patient. Support Introduction,
supra note 33. It also enjoys support from thrity-eight prominent physicians and
surgeons. Id
96. Support Introduction, supra note 33. See also Guttman, supra note 23.
97. Guttman, supra note 23. See also Wait-Listed to Death, supra note 11.
98. Support Introduction, supra note 33.
99. Guttman, supra note 23.
100. Wait-Listed to Death, supra note 11.
101. Klarenbach. supra note 82. As Arthur Matas, Professor of Surgery and Director
of the Kidney Transplant Program at the University of Minnesota stated, "[a]t the end of
the day, one must ask this simple question: [w]hich is the better option - establishing a
system of compensation (even though it might not be easy) or maintaining the status quo
(while transplant candidates suffer and die)?" Matas, supra note 11, at 19.
102. Klarenbach, supra note 82.
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employ caretaking services following the donation procedure.' 0 3 The goal of
OTPA is to alleviate the obstacles that prevent people from becoming donors
in the first place. This would have the overall effect of increasing organ
donation rates in the United States.
Studies by the University of Minnesota and the Cleveland Clinic
Foundation Department of Urology found that twenty-three percent of
kidney donors faced financial hardships or significant financial burdens,
including loss of income averaging $4,410.104 Although that figure does not
seem particularly high, it is often significant when considered with the fact
that most donors are family members of the recipient. Therefore, in addition
to the financial burdens associated with the donation itself, donors are also
faced with the costs associated with having to care for a chronically ill loved
one.105 The significance of this financial burden is apparent in the results of
a study involving 133 potential donors to a family member. o0 Twenty-four
percent of the study participants chose not to donate due to the anticipated
financial hurdles they would face as a result of the donation.lo7 The passage
of OTPA, which would allow incentives that target this group of potential
donors, would have the overall effect of increasing the number of donors.
Critics of OTPA, including activists from the Coalition for Organ-Failure
Solutions, os argue that although OTPA does not provide direct cash
compensation to donors, it still carries all of the negative consequences
associated with that model, including targeting the impoverished population
for organ donations.' 09 However, these allegations are unfounded because
OTPA can be read as providing for those donors who choose to donate their
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. (citing R.S. Knotts, W.F. Finn, & T. Armstrong. Psychosocial factors
impacting patients, donors, and nondonors involved in renal transplant evaluation, 15
KIDNEY FOUND. PERSP. 11 (1996)).
107. Id. The same study found a positive correlation between receiving a kidney from
a living donor and the income level of the recipient. Klarenbach, supra note 82.
108. The Coalition for Organ-Failure Solutions is a "non-profit . . . organization
committed to combating the trafficking of humans for organs and ending the exploitation
of the poor as a source of organ and tissue supplies." COALITION FOR ORGAN-FAILURE
SOLUTIONs, http://www.cofs.org/ (last visited October 25, 2010).
109. Guttman, supra note 23.
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organ to another without targeting impoverished populations by providing
direct cash payments. OTPA merely attempts to make the donor whole
again by allowing the government to redress the donor's losses, and to
provide reasonable incentives to encourage donations. 1o
C. The Need to Redress the Failures of NOTA
Reliance on altruistic donations under NOTA has not been successful in
increasing the number of donors. There are two main reasons for NOTA's
failure. First, donations from deceased donors can provide only a limited
number of viable organs, usually around 15,000 per year.111 Second, organ
donations by living family members are similarly limited.'12 NOTA has
failed to find a way of effectively increasing the number of organ donors in
the United States.
Additionally, NOTA is currently under attack by an October 2009 lawsuit
filed in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California.13 The
plaintiffs seek to allow incentives, such as tuition payment and mortgage
110. The National Kidney Foundation supports providing donors with compensation
for donation-related expenses. Dolph Chianchiano, the Vice President for Health Policy
and Research at the Foundation says, "The main reason [we support reimbursement] is
that it's the right thing to do for the living donors. . . [b]ut one would hope that it would
alleviate some concerns that potential living donors might have." Rachel Rettner, Great
Debate: Should Organ Donors be Paid?, LIVE SCIENCE (Aug. 10, 2009, 9:16 AM),
http://www.livescience.com/health/090810-organ-donation-incentives.html.
111. Peter A. Clark, Financial Incentives for Cadaveric Organ Donation: An Ethical
Analysis, INTERNET J. L., HEALTHCARE & ETHICS (2006), http://www.ispub.com/ostial
index.php?xmlFilePath=journals/ijlhe/vol4n l/organ.xml.
112. Id.
113. The plaintiff is suing U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder, Jr. to enjoin
enforcement of NOTA, which criminalizes compensating donors, arguing that this statute
violates the plaintiffs equal protection rights and substantive due process rights.
Complaint at 2, Flynn v. Holder, No. CVO9-07772 (C.D. Cal. 2009). "This criminal
prohibition violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution in two respects. First, the bone-marrow provision denies equal protection by
arbitrarily and irrationally treating renewable bone-marrow cells like nonrenewable solid
organs such as kidneys, instead of treating them like other renewable or inexhaustible
cells such as blood cells, sperm cells, and egg cells for which compensated donation is
legal. Second, the statute violates Plaintiffs' substantive-due-process right to participate
in safe, accepted, lifesaving medical treatment." Id.
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payments, for bone marrow donors.'14 The complaint states, "[t]his
constitutional challenge is about an arbitrary law that criminalizes a
promising effort to save lives."' 1 5 While this lawsuit is limited in scope to
bone marrow donations, the outcome could be the starting point for new
regulations regarding incentives for organ donations.
OTPA will be more effective in reaching the goals set out in NOTA,
particularly those which NOTA fails to accomplish. OTPA gives the states
flexibility in determining the best way to increase the number of organ
donors. Clearly establishing that states have the authority to provide certain
incentives to potential donors will alleviate many of the financial burdens
that preclude people from donating, thereby increasing the amount of organ
donors.
IV. NEW LEGISLATION IS NEEDED TO INCREASE THE NUMBER OF DONORS IN
THE UNITED STATES
A. Three Mandatory Elements for Legislation Attempting to Increase Organ
Donation Rates
The need for legislation to increase the number of organ donors is clearly
evident. However, it is difficult to determine the best way to accomplish this
goal. This is especially true in light of the fact that many people do not
become donors due to the financial restraints they will face as a result of
donating.116 However, providing direct compensation to donors would
target the impoverished population, thus demonstrating that, without
significant regulation, the organ procurement problem will not improve.
The United States must examine the successes and failures of organ donation
programs abroad in order to establish a comprehensive and viable system.
The systems of Spain and Iran should serve as guides because Spain is the
114. Tresa Baldas, Cancer Patients Seek to Overturn Ban on Paying for Bone
Marrow, THE NAT'L L. J. (Oct. 30, 2009), http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?
id= 1202435051781&Cancer Patients Seek to OverturnBan_onPayingforBone
Marrow; see also Ian Ayres, Is the Ban on Selling Bone Marrow Unconstitutional?, N.Y.
TIMES, (Nov. 3, 2009, 2:49 PM), http://freakonomics.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/11/03/is-
the-ban-on-selling-bone-marrow-unconstitutional/.
115. Baldas, supra note 114. As Jeff Rowes, the lead attorney for the plaintiffs points
out "when Congress passed the statute, it was to prevent kidneys, lungs and other organs
from being sold on the black market. Bone marrow got tucked in at the end of the
legislation." Id.
116. Klarenbach, supra note 82.
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leader in organ donation" 7 and Iran, despite the drawbacks its rogram
presents, is the only country in the world without an organ shortage.' 8
In order to be effective, legislation regulating organ donations must
contain three elements. First, the legislation must make the donor whole
again by allowing the donee, or a non-profit agency on the donee's behalf, to
pay for any out-of-pocket expenses resulting from the donation. Second, the
OPOs currently in place must be expanded to adopt a more family-centered
approach. Third, the legislation should provide specific incentives to entice
more people to donate organs, above and beyond the effort to compensate
the donee.
Any legislation regarding organ donation should not only provide
incentives to increase donors, but should also allow donees to pay the
expenses donors face such as travel, lost wages, and subsequent medical
bills. Additionally, the government should develop non-profit agencies to
reimburse expenses to donors if donees are unable to do so. This will
alleviate the concerns that prohibit many from becoming donors: people will
be more likely to donate if they know they do not have to be concerned with
paying for costs associated with being a donor.
The OPOs currently in place must be expanded to have a major presence
in every hospital in the country, and they must take a more family-centered
approach. OPOs must devote a majority of their efforts to informing
families of the recently deceased about the benefits and the need for organ
donors. This can be accomplished by increasing the number of coordinators
present in each hospital and by providing training concerning the best ways
to effectively discuss the subject with grieving families. Since OPOs are
currently in place, the implementation of the family-centered approach will
simply require additional training and support. Furthermore, the United
States can use Spain's system as a guide.
Incentives, but not direct payments, for donatin organs are also a vital
element of any legislation as illustrated in OTPA. Direct payments may
indirectly target the impoverished, but incentives merely attract people into
becoming donors. Providing a reasonable incentive, one not so drastic as to
influence a potential donor's decision, would increase the number of organ
donors in the country without the ethical concerns associated with direct
payment.
117. Wong, supra note 44; see also Silva, supra note 44.
I18. Hippen, supra note 55.
119. Wong, supra note 44.
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B. A Closer Examination of OTPA
OTPA provides a solid framework for increasing the number of donors in
the United States in the most equitable manner possible. However, in its
current state, it primarily addresses the third element detailed above,
allowing states to determine which, if any, incentives should be
implemented in order to increase donations. OTPA can be improved by
adding provisions regarding the first two elements addressed above,
allowing a donor to be compensated for expenses incurred as a result of the
donation and developing a more family-centered approach to OPOs.
Under OTPA, the states have broad discretion to determine what
incentives to offer in order to increase organ donation. One example is to
issue tax breaks to donors. This method was enacted in Wisconsin in 2004,
and allowed a state income tax deduction of up to $10,000 to cover the
expenses a donor may face.1 20 Many critics of the bill, including Howard M.
Nathan, President and Chief Executive of the Gift of Life Donor Program,12 1
say that the $10,000 incentive violates NOTA.122 Conversely, proponents,
including former State Representative Steve Wieckert,123 argue that such
deductions merely remove the financial obstacles preventing many people
from becoming donors.124 Kansas considered similar legislation in 2000, but
the state attorney general believed that the legislation would violate NOTA
and, as a result, it was never passed.125 This disagreement demonstrates the
120. Jo Napolitano, Wisconsin Senate Approves Tax Deduction for Organ Donors,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2004, at A12. Eligible expenses under the bill include travel,
lodging, and lost wages. Id.
121. The Gift of Life Donor Program, a non-profit agency serving the eastern half of
Pennsylvania, southern New Jersey and Delaware, is responsible for recovering and
distributing organs and tissues used in life-saving and life-enhancing transplants.
Overview of Gift of Life Donor Program, GIFT OF LIFE DONOR PROGRAM,
http://www.donorsLorg/about/overview/ (last visited Oct. 26, 2010).
122. Napolitano, supra note 120. See generally Lisa Milot, The Case Against Tax
Incentives for Organ Transfers, 45 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 67 (2008).
123. Representative Steve Wieckert authored the bill. Assem. B. 477, 2003 Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2003), http://www.legis.state.wi.us/2003/data/AB-477.pdf.
124. Napolitano, supra note 120.
125. Id.
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inconsistency in the states' understanding of the meaning of valuable
consideration under NOTA, and the need to clarify what is permissible in
order to increase the number of organ donors.
Another means of increasing the number of donors under OTPA would be
to discount fees associated with obtaining and renewing a driver license.126
This is a prime opportunity to reach individuals because most states ask
people if they would like to be organ donors and place this information on
their license. Georgia previously offered a nine-dollar discount to its
residents who registered as donors, but this incentive is no longer used
because the state was losing too much money.127 The legality of offering
driver's license discounts under NOTA is also a cause for concern.128
OTPA would also allow a donor's family to be compensated for
reasonable burial expenses.' Given how much the hospitals and doctors
gain from performing organ donations, "a 'standardized and small' amount,
perhaps $2,000, given through an agency like the Health Care Financing
Administration to 'a third party, like a funeral director"' should be permitted
in order to assist the families of donors. 130  Incentives such as those
discussed above would meet the goals established in NOTA by increasing
the number of organ donors, while also discouraging people from seeking
organs on the black market. Furthermore, OTPA would not establish an
environment targeting or discriminating against the impoverished because it
still bans direct compensation to donors and merely provides incentives for
the donor.'33
126. See Henry Hansmann, The Economics and Ethics of Markets for Human Organs,
14 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 57, 63 (1989).
127. Id.
128. Steve P. Calandrillo, Cash for Kidneys? Utilizing Incentives to End America's
Organ Shortage, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 69, 113-14 (2004).
129. This method has been previously suggested to Congress. A. Bruce Bowden,
General Counsel for the National Kidney Foundation and Partner at Duane Morris LLP
suggested this method to Congress in 1994. See Young, supra note 1.
130. Id "The Health Care Financing Administration . . . oversees the Medicare
program, the Federal portion of the Medicaid program, and related quality assurance
activities." Health Care Financing Administration, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVICES, http://www.hhs.gov/about/opdivs/hcfa.html (alternation in original) (last
visited October 25. 2010).
13 1. Support Introduction, supra note 33.
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Critics of financial incentives, such as Dr. Francis Delmonico,' a
transplant surgeon at Massachusetts General Hospital, argue that "any
attempt to assign a monetary value to the human body or its body parts, even
in the hope of increasing organ supply, diminishes human 'dignity and
devalues the very human life we seek to save." 33 However, OTPA does just
the opposite. Allowing the donation of human organs increases human
dignity and encompasses the value of human life. A person is giving up a
part of himself in order to save the life of another who the donor may not
even know. This is the very essence of valuing human life. The fact that the
donor may need some help along the way in order to donate is not
unreasonable. If the government values human life, it should pass
legislation that would increase the number of organ donors and save as many
lives as possible rather than maintain the flawed system currently in place.
V. ALTERNATIVES TO OTPA
There are other alternatives to consider that can be implemented in
addition to or in replacement of OTPA. These alternatives would increase
its effectiveness by also addressing the first recommendations detailed
previously. One such alternative would be to create a future market in
which donors would be paid. In a future market system, donors' organs
would be harvested only after death, and the donor's estate or designated
beneficiary would receive the compensation.' 34 Professor Lloyd Cohen of
George Mason University' 35 believes that compensation is the only way to
encourage organ donation.136 Professor Henry Hansmann of Yale
132. Dr. Francis L. Delmonico is a professor of surgery at Harvard Medical School
and the Director of Renal Transplantation at the Massachusetts General Hospital.
FACULTY BIOS, http://www.hdcn.com/symp/00asnsatg/facbios.htm (last visited Oct. 27,
2010).
133. Clark, supra note 111.
134. Cohen, supra note 13. See also George P. Smith, II, Market and Non-Market
Mechanisms for Procuring Human and Cadaveric Organs: When the Price Is Right, I
MED. L. INT'L 17, 27 (1993) (urging that the implementation of a future market system in
the United States warrants consideration).
135. Professor Lloyd R. Cohen is a law professor at George Mason University. He
has published articles on a variety of topics, including the market for transplant organs.
Professor Cohen's Home Page, GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY, SCHOOL OF LAW,
http://mason.gmu.edu/~1cohen2/ (last visited Oct. 26, 2010).
136. Cohen, supra note 13, at 51.
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University' 37 also believes in a future market, but he believes those who
indicate their wish to be donors upon their death should receive a reduction
in their insurance premiums during the course of their life rather than a cash
payment upon their death. Either method proposed would silence critics
who fear providing any compensation would be targeting the impoverished,
because these future market scenarios do not provide direct compensation
until death or merely provide reasonable incentives to entice people to
become donors.
Another alternative would be to employ a presumed consent system.139
This method, which does not take into account the wishes of the family, is
used in many foreign countries, including Austria, Denmark, France, Poland,
and Switzerland.140 Another, more flexible approach to a presumed consent
system is used in Finland, Greece, Italy, Norway, Belgium, Sweden, and as
previously discussed, Spain.141 In these countries, the family can override
the decision of the deceased to donate.142 The more strict presumed consent
system would be effective in the United States given that polls have shown
that over seventy-five percent of Americans say they would donate their
organs, but less than half actually choose to donate a family member's
organs when it comes time to make the decision.143 However, a
subcommittee of the United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS) Ethics
Committee rejected a presumed consent system as an option for three
reasons.144 First, the subcommittee thought the system does not adequately
137. Henry Hansmann is the Augustus E. Lines Professor of Law at Yale Law School.
He focuses on the law and economics of organizational ownership and structure.
Faculty, YALE LAW SCHOOL, http://www.law.yale.edu/faculty/HHansmann.htm (last
visited Oct. 26, 2010).
138. Hansmann, supra note 126, at 63.
139. Calandrillo, supra note 128, at 124.
140. Sheldon F. Kurtz & Michael J. Saks, The Transplant Paradox: Overwhelming
Public Support for Organ Donation vs. Under-Supply of Organs: The Iowa Organ
Procurement Study, 21 J. CORP. L. 767, 778 (1996).
14 1. Id.
142. Id.
143. Clark, supra note 1 11.
144. Id.
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protect the donor's autonomy.145 Second, the subcommittee was concerned
about ensuring that the wishes of those who chose not to be donors were
met.146 Finally, the subcommittee thought it was a better policy to require
prospective donors to express their preference.147  Under the presumed
consent system, providing incentives to donors is not as vital, but for this
system to be successful and reasonable, any possible side effects of donation
must be adequately conveyed to the entire population to ensure that each
person is making an informed decision.
A "mutual insurance pool" is yet another creative incentive states could
utilize to increase the number of donors.148 Under this method, persons
willing to donate their organs at death to other pool participants would
receive priority if they ever needed an organ.149 It would be necessary,
however, to determine if this type of incentive would be considered valuable
consideration under NOTA, unless that provision of NOTA is revised or
clarified.150  Additionally, the success of this method would need to be
closely monitored to ensure that it is increasing the number of organ donors
who are matches for those on the waiting list.
Another incentive option builds upon the idea that people may be more
likely to become donors if they have more opportunities to register. That is
the reasoning behind two bills proposed in Massachusetts that intend to
"revive a state organ-donation advisory board that would promote donor
registration, and to create a state fund to assist with the effort."'i5 Both bills
would continue to allow people to sign up to be donors when they renew
their driver's licenses, but would also present the opportunity to become a
donor when they renew their car registrations. 152 One bill would even allow
145. Id
146. Id
147. Id
148. See Richard Schwindt & Aidan Vining, Proposal for a Mutual Insurance Pool
for Transplant Organs, 23 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 725, 727 (1998).
149. Id at 728.
150. Id
151. John Laidler, Bills would Aid Efforts to Find Organ Donors, BOsTON GLOBE
(October 11, 2009), http://www.boston.com/news/local/articles/2009/10/11/
mass lawmakers-citepersonal stories in bills supporting organ donations/.
152. Id.
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people to register as donors on their tax returns, while the other bill suggests
permitting organ donor registration on voter registration cards.'53  The
success of this approach is evident in Colorado, where people are required to
state whether they want to be an organ donor in order to obtain a driver's
license, and sixty percent become donors.154  Ensuring that the public
understands the scope of the problem and is provided more opportunities to
make the informed decision to become a donor can only improve the current
situation.
Finally, if efforts to increase the number of organ donors prove
unsuccessful, legislators may consider ways to decrease the number of
people on the waiting list. This controversial move can be accomplished by
eliminating alcoholics, chronic smokers, and convicted felons from those
eligible to receive an organ.15 5 The reasoning behind barring alcoholics and
smokers is to hold individuals responsible for their actions and the
consequences that result, such as cirrhosis of the liver and lung cancer.' It
seems unfair to allow a person who has liver or lung problems due to his
conscious and voluntary decisions to receive an organ donation over
someone who needs an organ through no fault of his own.'57 Some experts,
including Dr. Lawrence Schneiderman, a medical professor at the University
of California, 58 suggest that people who are convicted of murder or other
153. Id.
154. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 42-2-107(V) (1981). See also Thomas D. Overcast et
al., Problems in the Identification of Potential Organ Donors, 251 JAMA 1559, 1560
(1984).
155. See, e.g., Alvin H. Moss & Mark Siegler, Should Alcoholics Compete Equally for
Liver Transplantation, 265 JAMA 1295 (1991). The waiting list could also be reduced
by minimizing access for older candidates and those with significant health problems as
those people are not as likely to fully recover from transplantation. Matas, supra note 11.
It may be more beneficial to allow this group access to organs that are derived from
donors who are less ideal. Id. However, "the logical extension of this argument would
be to limit access to diabetics, to women, to children, and to blacks (who have worse
long-term results than nondiabetics, men, adults, and whites)." Id.
156. Moss & Siegler, supra note 155, at 1296.
157. Id,
158. Dr. Lawrence Schneiderman is a professor emeritus in the Department of Family
and Preventive Medicine at the University of California, San Diego Medical Center,
Moores Cancer Center. He has published more than 170 medical and scientific
publications. Research/Clinical Summary, Moores Cancer Center, UNIV. OF CAL., SAN
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"heinous" crimes should not be eligible to receive transplants because they
should be barred from receiving "benefits from a society they violated."
These issues raise the question of whether ethical factors surrounding a
person's behavior should be raised when considering whether a person
should be added to the organ waiting list at all, or, conversely, where on the
list they should be placed. These methods to exclude individuals or place
them lower on the list should be of last resort, and the focus should remain
on increasing the number of donors rather than allowing more people to die
while waiting for organs, regardless of their past choices in life.
VI. CONCLUSION
Congress must address the dire need for organ donors in the United States.
OTPA is a solid stepping stone in reaching this goal. It directly addresses
the fact that many people do not donate for fear of the financial burdens they
will face as a result of being a donor. OTPA would allow the states to help
alleviate these concerns by directly addressing many of the hurdles donors
face, and, at the same time, would remain firm on the view that donors
should not be directly compensated with cash payments, as they currently
are in Iran.160 However, while OTPA is a good starting point, it falls short
of having any significant, long-term effect on the organ donation rates in the
United States.
Any successful piece of legislation must contain three elements in order to
be comprehensive and have a lasting impact: (1) allowance for the donee, or
a non-profit agency if the donee is impoverished, to pay for any out-of-
pocket expenses the donor may face as a result of the donation; (2)
expansion of OPOs currently in place and adoption of a more family-
centered approach; and (3) permission of specific incentives that do not
DIEGO MED. CTR., http://cancer.ucsd.edu/ summaries/ljschneiderman.asp (last visited
Oct. 26, 2010).
159. Prisoner Gets $1M Heart Transplant, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Jan. 31, 2002),
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/01/31/health/main326305.shtml. "You have to
wonder if a law-abiding, taxpaying citizen drew one last breath while Jailbouse Joe was
getting a second wind," wrote Los Angeles Times columnist Steve Lopez. Id However,
in regard to inmates who did not commit violent crimes (e.g., a prisoner serving a
fourteen year sentence for robbery) and receive life-prolonging transplants,
Schneiderman believes "[iut's reasonable to think the benefit we are giving him [the
prisoner] will be experienced by him with plenty of life left. Socially, he violated
society, but not so severely that he gives up his right to experience medical care." Id.
160. Wong, supra note 44.
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include direct compensation in order to entice more people to donate.1 61
Some permissible incentives include providing health or life insurance
coverage, funeral costs, and tax benefits. These incentives are enough to
return the donor to where he was prior to the donation, as well as to provide
some enticement for people to become donors in the first place without the
inherent risks of direct compensation.
OTPA focuses on the third recommendation, that legislation must provide
incentives to increase the number of donors only, and could be improved
upon by adding provisions regarding the first two elements. The United
States should not overlook the positive and negative results of the programs
in Iran and Spain. The United States can learn from these schemes and
improve upon those organ donation systems to fit the goals and principles of
our nation. This can be accomplished without advocating the sale of organs,
as in Iran, and without taking the choice away from the individual, as in
Spain. Without helping individuals to become donors, the organ waiting list
will continue to grow, countless numbers of viable organs will be wasted,
and, ultimately, more lives will be lost. The current organ donation systems
of Spain and Iran demonstrate that a well-designed legislative scheme can
effectively solve the shortage of organs. If the U.S. tailors the Spanish and
Iranian systems to its own domestic cultural and political ideals, it can solve
America's current organ shortage.
161. This view is endorsed by the American Society of Transplant Surgeons, the
American Medical Association (AMA) and the United Network for Organ Sharing.
CEJA Report 6 - 1-93, Financial Incentives for Organ Procurement: Ethical Aspects of
Future Contracts for Cadaveric Donors, AM. MED. Ass'N, http://www.ama-
assn.org/amal/pub/upload/mm/369/ceja_6i93.pdf (last visited Oct. 26, 2010). AMA
stated that the "time has come" and that "[tihere is enough evidence in favor of
employing some form of financial incentive to justify the implementation of a pilot
program." Id.
